This paper proposes that autonomous vehicles should be designed to reduce light pollution. In support of this specific proposal, a moral assessment of autonomous vehicles more comprehensive than the dilemmatic life-and-death questions of trolley problem-style situations is presented. The paper therefore consists of two interrelated arguments. The first is that autonomous vehicles are currently still a technology in development, and not one that has acquired its definitive shape, meaning the design of both the vehicles and the surrounding infrastructure is open-ended. (...) Design for values is utilized to articulate a path forward, by which engineering ethics should strive to incorporate values into a technology during its development phase. Second, it is argued that nighttime lighting—a critical supporting infrastructure—should be a prima facie consideration for autonomous vehicles during their development phase. It is shown that a reduction in light pollution, and more boldly a better balance of lighting and darkness, can be achieved via the design of future autonomous vehicles. Two case studies are examined through which autonomous vehicles may be designed for “driving in the dark.” Nighttime lighting issues are thus inserted into a broader ethics of autonomous vehicles, while simultaneously introducing questions of autonomous vehicles into debates about light pollution. (shrink)

When should we use care robots? In this paper we endorse the shift from a simple normative approach to care robots ethics to a complex one: we think that one main task of a care robot ethics is that of analysing the different ways in which different care robots may affect the different values at stake in different care practices. We start filling a gap in the literature by showing how the philosophical analysis of the nature of healthcare activities can (...) contribute to robot ethics. We rely on the nature-of-activities approach recently proposed in the debate on human enhancement, and we apply it to the ethics of care robots. The nature-of-activities approach will help us to understand why certain practice-oriented activities in healthcare should arguably be left to humans, but certain goal-directed activities in healthcare can be fulfilled with the assistance of a robot. In relation to the latter, we aim to show that even though all healthcare activities can be considered as practice-oriented, when we understand the activity in terms of different legitimate ‘fine-grained’ descriptions, the same activities or at least certain components of them can be seen as clearly goal-directed. Insofar as it allows us to ethically assess specific functionalities of specific robots to be deployed in well-defined circumstances, we hold the nature-of-activities approach to be particularly helpful also from a design perspective, i.e. to realize the Value Sensitive Design approach. (shrink)

The urban traffic environment is characterized by the presence of a highly differentiated pool of users, including vulnerable ones. This makes vehicle automation particularly difficult to implement, as a safe coordination among those users is hard to achieve in such an open scenario. Different strategies have been proposed to address these coordination issues, but all of them have been found to be costly for they negatively affect a range of human values (e.g. safety, democracy, accountability…). In this paper, we claim (...) that the negative value impacts entailed by each of these strategies can be interpreted as lack of what we call Meaningful Human Control over different parts of a sociotechnical system. We argue that Meaningful Human Control theory provides the conceptual tools to reduce those unwanted consequences, and show how “designing for meaningful human control” constitutes a valid strategy to address coordination issues. Furthermore, we showcase a possible application of this framework in a highly dynamic urban scenario, aiming to safeguard important values such as safety, democracy, individual autonomy, and accountability. Our meaningful human control framework offers a perspective on coordination issues that allows to keep human actors in control while minimizing the active, operational role of the drivers. This approach makes ultimately possible to promote a safe and responsible transition to full automation. (shrink)

The notion of “responsibility gap” with artificial intelligence (AI) was originally introduced in the philosophical debate to indicate the concern that “learning automata” may make more difficult or impossible to attribute moral culpability to persons for untoward events. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics of technology, the paper proposes a broader and more comprehensive analysis of the responsibility gap. The responsibility gap, it is argued, is not one problem but a set of at least four interconnected (...) problems – gaps in culpability, moral and public accountability, active responsibility—caused by different sources, some technical, other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. Responsibility gaps may also happen with non-learning systems. The paper clarifies which aspect of AI may cause which gap in which form of responsibility, and why each of these gaps matter. It proposes a critical review of partial and non-satisfactory attempts to address the responsibility gap: those which present it as a new and intractable problem (“fatalism”), those which dismiss it as a false problem (“deflationism”), and those which reduce it to only one of its dimensions or sources and/or present it as a problem that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools (“solutionism”). The paper also outlines a more comprehensive approach to address the responsibility gaps with AI in their entirety, based on the idea of designing socio-technical systems for “meaningful human control", that is systems aligned with the relevant human reasons and capacities. (shrink)

In this paper, in line with the general framework of value-sensitive design, we aim to operationalize the general concept of “Meaningful Human Control” in order to pave the way for its translation into more specific design requirements. In particular, we focus on the operationalization of the first of the two conditions investigated: the so-called ‘tracking’ condition. Our investigation is led in relation to one specific subcase of automated system: dual-mode driving systems. First, we connect and compare meaningful human control with (...) a concept of control very popular in engineering and traffic psychology, and we explain to what extent tracking resembles and differs from it. This will help clarifying the extent to which the idea of meaningful human control is connected to, but also goes beyond, current notions of control in engineering and psychology. Second, we take the systematic analysis of practical reasoning as traditionally presented in the philosophy of human action and we adapt it to offer a general framework where different types of reasons and agents are identified according to their relation to an automated system’s behaviour. This framework is meant to help explaining what reasons and what agents play a role in controlling a given system, thereby enabling policy makers to produce usable guidelines and engineers to design systems that properly respond to selected human reasons. In the final part, we discuss a practical example of how our framework could be employed in designing automated driving systems. (shrink)

The paper has two goals. The first is presenting the main results of the recent report Ethics of Connected and Automated Vehicles: recommendations on road safety, privacy, fairness, explainability and responsibility written by the Horizon 2020 European Commission Expert Group to advise on specific ethical issues raised by driverless mobility, of which the author of this paper has been member and rapporteur. The second is presenting some broader ethical and philosophical implications of these recommendations, and using these to contribute to (...) the establishment of Ethics of Transportation as an independent branch of applied ethics. The recent debate on the ethics of Connected and Automated Vehicles presents a paradox and an opportunity. The paradox is the presence of a flourishing debate on the ethics of one very specific transportation technology without ethics of transportation being in itself a well-established academic discipline. The opportunity is that now that a spotlight has been switched on the ethical dimensions of CAVs it may be easier to establish a broader debate on ethics of transportation. While the 20 recommendations of the EU report are grouped in three macro-areas: road safety, data ethics, and responsibility, in this paper they will be grouped according to eight philosophical themes: Responsible Innovation, road justice, road safety, freedom, human control, privacy, data fairness, responsibility. These are proposed as the first topics for a new ethics of transportation. (shrink)

How does the use of military drones affect the legal, political, and moral responsibility of different actors involved in their deployment and design? This volume offers a fresh contribution to the ethics of drone warfare by providing, for the first time, a systematic interdisciplinary discussion of different responsibility issues raised by military drones. The book discusses four main sets of questions: First, from a legal point of view, we analyse the ways in which the use of drones makes the attribution (...) of criminal responsibility to individuals for war crimes more complicated and what adjustments may be required in international criminal law and in military practices to avoid ’responsibility gaps’ in warfare. From a moral and political perspective, the volume looks at the conditions under which the use of military drones by states is impermissible, permissible, or even obligatory and what the responsibilities of a state in the use of drones towards both its citizens and potential targets are. From a socio-technical perspective, what kind of new human machine interaction might drones bring and which new kinds of shared agency and responsibility? Finally, we ask how the use of drones changes our conception of agency and responsibility. The book will be of interest to scholars and students in ethics and to those in law, politics and the military involved in the design, deployment and evaluation of military drones. (shrink)

We argue that lack of direct and conscious control is not, in principle, a reason to be afraid of machines in general and robots in particular: in order to articulate the ethical and political risks of increasing automation one must, therefore, tackle the difficult task of precisely delineating the theoretical and practical limits of sustainable delegation to robots.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is predicted to have a deep impact on the future of work and employment. The paper outlines a normative framework to understand and protect human freedom and justice in this transition. The proposed framework is based on four main ideas: going beyond the idea of a Basic Income to compensate the losers in the transition towards AI-driven work, towards a Responsible Innovation approach, in which the development of AI technologies is governed by an inclusive and deliberate societal (...) judgment; going beyond a philosophical conceptualisation of social justice only focused on the distribution of ‘primary goods’, towards one focused on the different goals, values, and virtues of various social practices (Walzer’s ‘spheres of justice’) and the different individual capabilities of persons (Sen’s ‘capabilities’); going beyond a classical understanding of capital, towards one explicitly including mental capacities as a source of value for AI-driven activities. In an effort to promote an interdisciplinary approach, the paper combines political and economic theories of freedom, justice and capital with recent approaches in applied ethics of technology, and starts applying its normative framework to some concrete example of AI-based systems: healthcare robotics, ‘citizen science’, social media and platform economy. (shrink)

How should autonomous vehicles be programmed to behave in the event of an unavoidable accident in which the only choice open is one between causing different damages or losses to different objects or persons? This paper addresses this ethical question starting from the normative principles elaborated in the law to regulate difficult choices in other emergency scenarios. In particular, the paper offers a rational reconstruction of some major principles and norms embedded in the Anglo-American jurisprudence and case law on the (...) “doctrine of necessity”; and assesses which, if any, of these principles and norms can be utilized to find reasonable guidelines for solving the ethical issue of the regulation of the programming of autonomous vehicles in emergency situations. The paper covers the following topics: the distinction between “justification” and “excuse”, the legal prohibition of intentional killing outside self-defence, the incommensurability of goods, and the legal constrains to the use of lethal force set by normative positions: obligations, responsibility, rights, and authority. For each of these principles and constrains the possible application to the programming of autonomous vehicles is discussed. Based on the analysis, some practical suggestions are offered. (shrink)

Accountability and responsibility are key concepts in the academic and societal debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems, but these notions are often used as high-level overarching constructs and are not operationalised to be useful in practice. “Meaningful Human Control” is often mentioned as a requirement for the deployment of Autonomous Weapon Systems, but a common definition of what this notion means in practice, and a clear understanding of its relation with responsibility and accountability is also lacking. In this paper, we present (...) a definition of these concepts and describe the relations between accountability, responsibility, control and oversight in order to show how these notions are distinct but also connected. We focus on accountability as a particular form of responsibility—the obligation to explain one’s action to a forum—and we present three ways in which the introduction of Autonomous Weapon Systems may create “accountability gaps”. We propose a Framework for Comprehensive Human Oversight based on an engineering, socio-technical and governance perspective on control. Our main claim is that combining the control mechanisms at technical, socio-technical and governance levels will lead to comprehensive human oversight over Autonomous Weapon Systems which may ensure solid controllability and accountability for the behaviour of Autonomous Weapon Systems. Finally, we give an overview of the military control instruments that are currently used in the Netherlands and show the applicability of the comprehensive human oversight Framework to Autonomous Weapon Systems. Our analysis reveals two main gaps in the current control mechanisms as applied to Autonomous Weapon Systems. We have identified three first options as future work for the design of a control mechanism, one in the technological layer, one in the socio-technical layer and one the governance layer, in order to achieve comprehensive human oversight and ensure accountability over Autonomous Weapon Systems. (shrink)

When should humans enhance themselves? We try to answer this question by engaging in a conceptual analysis of the nature of different activities. We think that cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible in some practice-oriented activities, such as some educational activities, when it is the case both that cognitive enhancement would negatively affect the point of those activities and that we have good reasons to value that point. We then argue that cognitive enhancement should be allowed in two groups of cases, (...) namely in practice-oriented activities, such as recreational activities on which little moral value or social import hangs, and in some prominently goal-directed activities, such as high-responsibility professions, the goal of which has significant moral or social value. Finally, we argue that the use of efficacious and relatively safe cognitive enhancers may even be obligatory in those high-responsibility professions under certain special circumstances. (shrink)

David Shoemaker has claimed that a binary approach to moral responsibility leaves out something important, namely instances of marginal agency, cases where agents seem to be eligible for some responsibility responses but not others. In this paper we endorse and extend Shoemaker’s approach by presenting and discussing one more case of marginal agency not yet covered by Shoemaker or in the other literature on moral responsibility. Our case is that of Kenneth Parks, a Canadian man who drove a long way (...) to his mother-in-law’s and killed her in a state of somnambulism. We support our claim about Parks’ marginal responsibility in three steps: we first deny that Parks acts involuntarily as traditionally claimed in the legal literature; we then propose to extend Shoemaker’s analysis of marginal responsibility based on quality of will so as to include two other dimensions: the moral status of the agent and the actual causal effects of their actions; finally, we distinguish Parks’ marginal responsibility from four other existing concepts: “tracing”, diminished responsibility, causal responsibility, and moral disapproval without responsibility. (shrink)

The paper presents a framework to realise “meaningful human control” over Automated Driving Systems. The framework is based on an original synthesis of the results of the multidisciplinary research project “Meaningful Human Control over Automated Driving Systems” lead by a team of engineers, philosophers, and psychologists at Delft University of the Technology from 2017 to 2021. Meaningful human control aims at protecting safety and reducing responsibility gaps. The framework is based on the core assumption that human persons and institutions, not (...) hardware and software and their algorithms, should remain ultimately—though not necessarily directly—in control of, and thus morally responsible for, the potentially dangerous operation of driving in mixed traffic. We propose an Automated Driving System to be under meaningful human control if it behaves according to the relevant reasons of the relevant human actors (tracking), and that any potentially dangerous event can be related to a human actor (tracing). We operationalise the requirements for meaningful human control through multidisciplinary work in philosophy, behavioural psychology and traffic engineering. The tracking condition is operationalised via a proximal scale of reasons and the tracing condition via an evaluation cascade table. We review the implications and requirements for the behaviour and skills of human actors, in particular related to supervisory control and driver education. We show how the evaluation cascade table can be applied in concrete engineering use cases in combination with the definition of core components to expose deficiencies in traceability, thereby avoiding so-called responsibility gaps. Future research directions are proposed to expand the philosophical framework and use cases, supervisory control and driver education, real-world pilots and institutional embedding. (shrink)

We propose a multi-step evaluation schema designed to help procurement agencies and others to examine the ethical dimensions of autonomous systems to be applied in the security sector, including autonomous weapons systems.

This is the short version, in French translation by Anne Querrien, of the originally jointly authored paper: Müller, Vincent C., ‘Autonomous killer robots are probably good news’, in Ezio Di Nucci and Filippo Santoni de Sio, Drones and responsibility: Legal, philosophical and socio-technical perspectives on the use of remotely controlled weapons. - - - L’article qui suit présente un nouveau système d’armes fondé sur des robots qui risque d’être prochainement utilisé. À la différence des drones qui sont manoeuvrés (...) à distance mais comportent une part importante de discernement humain, il s’agit de machines programmées pour défendre, attaquer, ou tuer de manière autonome. Les auteurs, philosophes, préfèrent prévenir de leur prochaine diffusion et obtenir des Nations Unies leur régulation. Une campagne internationale propose plutôt leur interdiction. (shrink)

This collection of original essays on political and legal theory concentrates on themes dealt with in the work of Felix Oppenheim, including fundamental political and legal concepts and their implications for the scope of morality in politics and international relations. Among the issues addressed are the relationship between empirical and normative definitions of "freedom", "power", and "interests", whether governments are free to act against the national interest, and whether they can ever be morally obliged to do so.

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and (...) political philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

1 Orestano e l’anagrafe di un significato Chi si avvicina alla crescente letteratura sull’ontologia sociale provenendo da studi di filosofia del diritto ha spesso la sensazione di avere a che fare con qualcosa di familiare. Ciò dipende in parte dal fatto che la riflessione sul diritto ha da sempre una dimensione ontologica. Andando molto indietro nel tempo si trovano diverse testimonianze della consapevolezza che postulare l’esistenza di qualcosa non sia un’operazione intellettuale innocente....

The framework for this contribution is the transformation of the textual community, namely, modern society, into a digital community, in other words, a network society. This paper analyzes two theses. The first holds that the text, due to its genetic and historic nature, is always IMMUTABLE, STABLE, and never mobile. For this reason, the text represents the foundational element of a specific society, modern society. The second thesis is based on the assertion that within information and hypertext technologies two diverse (...) views confront and contrast each other. I locate these tendencies in the following key words: “dream” (Nelson) and “intellect” (Engelbart). Hypertext technology and culture represent the most transformative location and agency, they are the actors of the paradigm shift in which we are implicated. The hypertext revolution is based on the criticism of and attack against the material supports of writing and reading, as well as typographic technologies. Hypertext fights and wins this battle. However, hypertext technology is not able to reach the deep structure of alphabetic culture that is made not only of material support but also mental and bodily experience, consolidated and evolving, and of social relationships that are implied in the materiality of the support. La cornice di riferimento di questo contributo è la trasformazione della società testuale, cioè della società moderna, in società digitale, ovvero nella società dei network. Nell’intervento vengono analizzate due tesi: la prima afferma che il testo, per sua natura genetica e storica, è sempre IMMUTABILE, STABILE e non è mai mobile e per questo è fondativo di una società specifica, quella che noi chiamiamo la società moderna. La seconda tesi si basa sull’assunto che all’interno della cultura informatica e tecnologica che genera gli ipertesti si confrontano e si scontrano due idee diverse. Identifico queste due tendenze nelle parole chiave: dream (Nelson) e intellect (Engelbart). La tecnologia e la cultura ipertestuale sono il luogo e l’agente più fortemente trasformativi, gli attori del cambio di paradigma che ci coinvolge. La rivoluzione ipertestuale ha le sue basi nell’attacco e nella critica dei supporti materiali della scrittura e della lettura e sulle tecnologie tipografiche. L’ipertesto combatte e vince questa battaglia. La tecnologia ipertestuale non riesce però a raggiungere la struttura profonda della cultura alfabetica che è composta non solo da supporti ma da esperienze sia della mente sia del corpo, da relazioni sociali consolidate e mutanti che sono sottese e operanti con la materialità del supporto. (shrink)

1. Chiarificazione e valutazione. H.L.A. Hart è stato uno dei più influenti filosofi del diritto del ventesimo secolo. In particolare nei paesi di lingua inglese, i suoi scritti sono stati a lungo il punto di riferimento per gli studiosi della disciplina. Tale opinione è largamente diffusa, anche tra coloro – e non sono pochi – che ne hanno criticato, talvolta in modo severo, i lavori. Di recente questo primato è stato messo in discussione per via della crescente attenzione suscitata dal (...) pens... (shrink)

Partindo do pressuposto de que os obstáculos epistemológicos, propostos por Gaston Bachelard, provocam situações de imobilidade frente ao conhecimento, impossibilitando, na maioria das vezes, o desenvolvimento científico e bloqueando as capacidades dos sujeitos para uma atuação crítica e questionadora, característica da nova ciência, este artigo tem a finalidade de refletir sobre as contribuições da formação inicial do pedagogo para a desconstrução da experiência primeira. Para tanto, optou-se por uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental pautada nos estudos de Bachelard que trata dos (...) obstáculos epistemológicos à formação do espírito científico, nas Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais do Curso de Pedagogia e dados de Programas de Pós-Graduação Stricto Sensu de 08 Instituições Públicas e Privadas de Ensino Superior dos Estados do Rio Grande do Sul e de Santa Catarina, no recorte temporal de 2018. Tal relação, entre o que descreve as Diretrizes e o que Bachelard pontua na formação do espírito científico, apresenta-se como possibilidade de compreensão e abertura de discussões a respeito do distanciamento de profissionais pedagogos dos espaços de pesquisa e experiências científicas em educação. A partir do contato com as obras pesquisadas e as Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais para o Curso de Pedagogia, Licenciatura, percebeu-se entendimentos sobre a formação do pedagogo pesquisador, assim como pretextos para a necessidade de se continuar insistindo nessa dimensão formativa. Ainda, constatou-se que a formação inicial pode colaborar para a constituição do espírito científico do pedagogo, ampliando suas atuações enquanto cientista da educação. Para isso, torna-se necessário que os cursos de formação inicial tenham como fundamento a existência de obstáculos que podem, de modo negativo, contribuir para a inércia de seus estudantes. Palavras-chave: Espírito científico. Formação de pedagogos. Diretrizes Curriculares da Pedagogia. (shrink)

O objectivo deste artigo é apresentar um conjunto de reflexões sobre o imaginário literário de Hidácio, bispo de Chaves, na conjuntura política da província hispânica da Galécia, durante o século V.

Nella seconda metà del Novecento la conoscenza dell'etica anglosassone in Italia è stata alquanto parziale. Si pensava che il mondo dell'etica di lingua inglese fosse stato dominato nel Novecento dallo scientismo neopositivista o pragmatista che non riusciva a concepire l'etica se non nella forma tecnicizzata dell'analisi del linguaggio o metaetica. In questo modo si è ignorata tutta una ripresa dell'etica normativa, in particolare di Kant e di Aristotele, o la ripresa del diritto naturale che ha tra i suoi principali riferimenti (...) storici il pensiero di Tommaso d'Aquino intorno alla legge. Questo volume presenta un quadro della filosofia pratica anglosassone degli ultimi cinquant'anni. (shrink)

Este artigo procura apresentar algumas considerações acerca do entrecruzamento do pensamento político de Hannah Arendt e a questão ambiental. Para tanto, o seguinte questionamento servirá de guia para a reflexão aqui pretendida: se o âmbito natural é perturbado pelas ações humanas, é razoável a crença de que a própria ação humana possa ser capaz de frear o atual cenário de catástrofe? Assim sendo, assume-se, aqui, como procedimento metodológico uma análise bibliográfica que recorre ao livro A condição humana (The human condition, (...) 1958 [2010]) e alguns ensaios da coletânea Entre o passado e o futuro (Between Past and Future, 1961 [2009]). De modo geral, busca-se desenvolver o argumento de que embora não se possa enquadrar Hannah Arendt no rol das “historiadoras das ciências”, tampouco uma “pensadora da ecologia”, é certo que ela nunca deixou de se interessar e comentar os eventos científicos de seu tempo, bem como de se preocupar com as consequências das ações humanas. Logo, os assuntos relacionados aos avanços tecnológicos e científicos constituem assuntos de primeira grandeza e importância tanto para o mundo quanto para a política. Em suma, pretende-se sustentar a hipótese de que para Hannah Arendt, a imagem adotada da natureza – ao menos desde a época moderna –, e as ações humanas cometidas a partir desta compreensão, afetam diretamente nossa existência política. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta uma reflexão sobre a guerra a partir de Carl Schmitt e Hannah Arendt. Para tanto, realiza-se um recorte na obra de cada autor. De Carl Schmitt, discute-se o livro O conceito do político (2009) que contém ainda A teoria do Partisan. De Hannah Arendt, restringe-se a Sobre a violência (2001), A promessa da política (2020), e alguns ensaios contidos em Entre o passado e o futuro (2009). Neste sentido, Carl Schmitt permite discutir o papel da inimizade para (...) a decisão acerca da guerra e como essa situação-limite, ao mesmo tempo, constitui e afeta a dimensão do político. Já Hannah Arendt permite delinear certos traços constitutivos das guerras modernas que escapam à preocupação central Schmittiana, sobretudo o perigo intrínseco da inimizade produzir não a intensificação do político, mas a eliminação da vida humana sobre à Terra. Trata-se, enfim, de pensar o efeito do avanço tecnológico no campo dos assuntos humanos e como essa tópica transforma o estatuto da guerra. (shrink)